❤ ♪♫♬ ME AND MEWSIC ♬♫♪ ❤: November 2011

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The Twin Towers, 9.11

It started with a vision. In 1996 a terrorist called Khalid Sheikh Mohammed met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. He pitched the al-Qaeda leader an audacious plan to hijack 10 planes and crash nine of them into United States landmarks: the CIA headquarters, the Pentagon, nuclear power plants, the World Trade Center. The 10th plane would be flown by KSM himself, who would land it, kill the male passengers and deliver a speech excoriating US support for Israel.

Though he thought it impractical, bin Laden was attracted by the plan’s spectacle of terror. He authorised KSM to start working on the “planes operation” and promised to provide the funds and the fanatics needed to carry it out. Five years later, the September 11 attacks claimed the lives of 2,977 innocents.

Reading The 9/11 Commission Report (Norton, £9.99), a forensic account first published in 2004 but reissued this year with a new afterword by the commission’s executive director Philip Zelikow, one is struck by the way in which al-Qaeda was driven by a desire for dramatic but practically useless or even counterproductive gestures. Unable to mobilise the people to overthrow repressive governments in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri cooked up a grand theory in which “lurid phantom enemies” (in Zelikow’s words) such as the Jews were paired with “a historical narrative in which America has always been a faithless friend”.

They have remarkably few political demands. Even the dream of reviving the caliphate is more rhetorical gesture than genuine ambition: Islamic monarchs require a conservative and hierarchical society while al-Qaeda is radical and destabilising. Like Muslim Jacobins, they are guided by a theory of a righteous conflict that has no end because it is an end in itself.

Certainly they have done more harm to Muslims – in terms of reputation and also physically – than any Western power. Since 9/11 there have been wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, and countless terrorist attacks, mostly against Muslims. In all, around 250,000 people are thought to have died in what Jason Burke calls The 9/11 Wars (Allen Lane, £30). Burke is a superb journalist who has covered the conflict from its inception and his lucid overview shows how Western powers were deceived into elevating a serious security problem into a global war on terror. The trend started early on, when the initial plan to dismantle bin Laden’s terrorist infrastructure gradually developed into, as Burke says, an “extremely ambitious bid to reconstruct and develop Afghanistan in the image of a liberal, democratic and pluralistic Western state”.

The West’s idealism was understandable. Few could lament the removal of the Taliban (party slogan: “Throw reason to the dogs, it stinks of corruption”); and what could better suit a politician such as Tony Blair – a true believer in righteousness and being seen to be righteous – than to sweeten a nasty conflict with an intractable enemy by using the universal language of human rights?

The problem was that neither he nor George W Bush considered that building a school for a Pashtun village one week meant nothing if it had to be destroyed the next when the Taliban took it over. That modernisation came at the same time as military intervention meant that for many Afghans, the former has become associated with the latter, with disastrous consequences.

The adventure in Iraq showed the biggest gap between Western rhetoric and reality. From being a tightly controlled dictatorship, Iraq was turned into a battleground – real and symbolic – where US and British soldiers fought local insurgents and foreign terrorists inspired by al-Qaeda. The story of how intelligence about WMD was manipulated to make the case for war is familiar. Just as telling, though, was how few troops were committed to the invasion and subsequent occupation. Around 200,000 troops (about a quarter British) were deployed in 2003; in the 1991 Gulf War that ejected Saddam’s forces from Kuwait (but did not invade Iraq) it was closer to a million.

The US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld was obsessed with having quick-moving and flexible forces: large numbers, as the Gulf War commander and secretary of state Colin Powell wanted, made a bigger target and were redolent of the Big State some Republicans loathed. Overstretched and facing an increasingly bitter population, the army was unable to cope when the occupation took a disastrous course.

In A War of Choice: the British in Iraq 2003-9 (Jonathan Cape, £20), Jack Fairweather examines our less than glorious role. The Army was posted to southern Iraq where it was felt its imperial experience would offer an advantage. The mood was confident: “It’s just like running Portsmouth,” said the first British major put in charge of Basra, “we can do this.” But he only had 8,000 soldiers in charge of 4 million people – enough to antagonise, not enough to dominate – and the cultural knowledge the British had claimed was non-existent. One early error was to appoint a Sunni leader to run Shia Basra. The ensuing civil war would be a grim education.

Fairweather includes the story of Haider Samad, an Iraqi who welcomed the invasion and worked as a translator for the Army. Soon he began to get death threats from the Mahdi army Shia militia. When the army withdrew from Basra in September 2007, he was a marked man. After a tortuous wait, Haider and his wife were given asylum in the UK and so now, instead of a peaceful and democratic Iraq, they live in a council house in Hull.

Meanwhile, al-Qaeda attacks were spreading. Attacks on the Madrid railways in 2004 and on London transport in 2005 seemed to confirm the thesis that invading Iraq had made the West less safe. Yet the anti-war movement’s simple narrative underplayed the attackers’ responsibility. Burke shows how the 7/7 ringleader, Mohammad Sidique Khan, transformed himself from a strongly religious youth worker in Beeston into someone prepared to kill others and himself. “Khan had come to share the classic ‘single-narrative’ view of the world common to Islamic militants,” forever watching videos of Iraqis and Afghans being killed and holding anyone who lived in Britain “directly responsible” – as he said in his posthumously released videotape – for their deaths. Of course, Khan himself and the other three 7/7 bombers were British citizens also, which leads me to wonder whether their suicide might also have been an expression of self-hatred.

One thing that unites suicide bombers is that they are culturally dislocated, alienated from their families and communities and thus susceptible to the all-embracing narrative of Islam vs the West. Burke interviews an Iraqi suicide bomber who gave himself up at the last second because he heard one of his potential victims speaking with the accent of his home town. The numbness faded and feeling returned only when the theory of al-Qaeda gave way to a spontaneous emotional response to another human.

More broadly support for suicide attacks in Muslim countries fell dramatically once their own streets were targeted. It’s one thing sitting in a café in Jordan and discoursing casually about how the Americans “had it coming” on 9/11; quite another when hotels in Amman are blown up and people you know or might have known are killed.

While Iraq has stabilised, the original theatre of the conflict – Afghanistan and, lately, neighbouring Pakistan – have returned to the headlines. Toby Harnden, this newspaper’s US correspondent, has written a gripping account of the Welsh Guards’ tour of Helmand Province in 2009. You can draw important political conclusions from Dead Men Risen(Quercus, £8.99): it will not make comfortable reading for Gordon Brown, whose slashing of the helicopter budget in 2004 led to so many problems later on. But what will stay with me most is the presentation of ordinary soldiers in all their complexity.

At the centre of the narrative is Lt Col Rupert Thorneloe, a charismatic and intelligent leader who was the most senior commander killed since the Falklands conflict. His death focused the public mind on a conflict that no one could coherently explain. We went into Afghanistan to chase out al-Qaeda and defeating the Taliban was a means to that end. But the terrorists have gone elsewhere and we are still there, fighting with good intentions but little realism. Our soldiers have borne the burden of that decision. “The shell that is the human being is fragile,” said Capt Terry Harman. “It’s a bit fractured. We crossed the line of humanity.”

As we discovered in May when Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, al-Qaeda has now fled across the border. Anatol Lieven has written a fascinating and counter-intuitive portrayal in Pakistan: a Hard Country (Allen Lane, £30). Drawing on six months’ field research, this book is required reading for anyone in counter-terrorism. The much-maligned Pakistan army is shown to be the only functioning institution in the country and, despite extremist infiltration, there is little chance of their nuclear arsenal being stolen or misused. Its predicament is that when it makes a deal with the Pakistani Taliban it is attacked for being too weak; but when it goes after them, it is accused of excessive violence and provoking more suicide attacks.

A culture of conspiracy theory and simplistic anti-Americanism has infected all parts of its society – even the intelligentsia. How can you face up to the reality of the situation or the sacrifices needed to deal with it if most Pakistanis still believe 9/11 was an Israeli conspiracy or that India is funding the Taliban?

“All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.” That misquotation from Edmund Burke trips easily off the tongue, but after 10 years of war our leaders would do better to read what Burke did actually write about the French Jacobins. He warned of those keen “to engage in perilous adventures of untried policy; to neglect those provisions, preparations and precautions which distinguish benevolence from imbecility; and without which no man can answer for the salutary effect of any abstract plan of government or of freedom.”

As for those in the Muslim world seeking liberation from dictatorships, surely the Arab Spring with its (mainly) peaceful action and humane vision will prove irresistible. Only then will al-Qaeda be written out of the story.

* Sameer Rahim is a judge for next year’s Orwell Prize

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anna hazare
‎10 things to know about Anna Hazare 'n Jan Lok Pal Bill.. !
1. Who is Anna Hazare?
An ex-army man. Fought 1965 Indo-Pak War
2. What's so special about him?
He built a village Ralegaon Siddhi in Ahamad Nagar district, Maharashtra
3. So what?
This village is a self-sustained model village. Energy is produced in the village itself from solar power, biofuel and wind mills.
In 1975, it used to be a poverty clad village. Now it is one of the richest village in India. It has become a model for self-sustained, eco-friendly & harmonic village.
4. Ok,...?
This guy, Anna Hazare was awarded Padma Bhushan and is a known figure for his social activities.
5. Really, what is he fighting for?
He is supporting a cause, the amendment of a law to curb corruption in India.
6. How that can be possible?
He is advocating for a Bil, The Jan Lokpal Bill (The Citizen Ombudsman Bill), that will form an autonomous authority who will make politicians (ministers), beurocrats (IAS/IPS) accountable for their deeds.
8. It's an entirely new thing right..?
In 1972, the bill was proposed by then Law minister Mr. Shanti Bhushan. Since then it has been neglected by the politicians and some are trying to change the bill to suit thier theft (corruption).
7. Oh.. He is going on a hunger strike for that whole thing of passing a Bill ! How can that be possible in such a short span of time?
The first thing he is asking for is: the government should come forward and announce that the bill is going to be passed.
Next, they make a joint committee to DRAFT the JAN LOKPAL BILL. 50% goverment participation and 50% public participation. Because you cant trust the government entirely for making such a bill which does not suit them.
8. Fine, What will happen when this bill is passed?
A LokPal will be appointed at the centre. He will have an autonomous charge, say like the Election Commission of India. In each and every state, Lokayukta will be appointed. The job is to bring all alleged party to trial in case of corruptions within 1 year. Within 2 years, the guilty will be punished. Not like, Bofors scam or Bhopal Gas Tragedy case, that has been going for last 25 years without any result.
9. Is he alone? Whoelse is there in the fight with Anna Hazare?
Baba Ramdev, Ex. IPS Kiran Bedi, Social Activist Swami Agnivesh, RTI activist Arvind Kejriwal and many more.
Prominent personalities like Aamir Khan is supporting his cause.
10. Ok, got it. What can I do?
At least we can spread the message. How?
Putting status message, links, video, changing profile pics.
At least we can support Anna Hazare and the cause for uprooting corruption from India.
At least we can hope that his Hunger Strike does not go in vain.
At least we can pray for his good health.
Thanks for reading.
Please Spread This msg As Much As You Can 'n Tell Others To Do The Same..

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